

JOINT OECD/IRGC EXPERT WORKSHOP Risk and Crisis Communication Opportunities and Challenges of Social Media

June 29, 2012

Office of Global Communications
Prime Minister's Office


Agenda

The Great East Japan Earthquake

Disaster prevention history and activities since the Earthquake

Implications and our challenge

Unprecedented challenge for Japan since 3-11



The Great East Earthquakes

Earthquakes

- M-9.0 quake (March 11)
- M-7.0 class 5 times
- M-6.0 class 71 times
- M-5.0 class 380 times (As of May 16th)

Casualties (As of July)

Dead : over 15,600

Missing: over 4900

Injured: over 5,300

Evacuees (As of May)

Over 124,000

Main cause of physical damage was enormous tsunami

The Great East Japan Earthquake led to a compound of disasters


Structure of the chain of compound damage

(1)**Primary** damage

(2) **Secondary** damage caused by material factors

(3)**Secondary** damage caused by psychologic al factors

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Damage

2:46 pm, Mar 11

Magnitude 9.0 earthquake at Sanriku coast

3:51 pm, Mar 11

 9.3m tsunami strikes Soma city, Fukushima prefecture

3:36 pm, Mar 12

- Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactor 1 structure collapses
- Atomic fuel meltdown occurs

Mar 14 ~

Rolling blackouts in Kanto prefectures in March

Mar 14 ~

 At least 50 countries/regions, starting with H.K. & China, impose import restrictions apart from products restricted by the Japanese Gvt.

Mar~

Visitors decrease 50% compared to 2010

numbers

overseas

Plummet in

foreign tourist

Agenda

The Great East Japan Earthquake

Activities since the Earthquake

Implications and our challenge

Disaster prevention system in Japan has been developed over time

1923 Great Kanto quake

World first quake-resistant building regulations

1959 Ise Bay Typhoon

Early warning system

• Mt Fuji summit radar "Himawari"

1995 Hanshin Awaji quake

Implementation of Earthquake Early Warning bottom-up & top-down

After the Ise Bay typhoon in 1959, the Japanese government made extensive effort to develop the disaster prevention system

History of disasters in Japan

	Year	Dead/ missing	Lessons	Policies introduced	
Nobi earthquake	1891	7,300	Government made aware of the importance of earthquake measures	Former Ministry of Education established a disaster prevention investigation committee [disaster risk reduction] • Began earthquake resistance structure research — Researched Western earthquake resistance construction	
Great Kanto earthquake	1923	105,000	Unprecedented damage Buildings constructed using Western earthquake resistance technology collapsed	Revised town construction law [disaster risk reduction] • First earthquake resistance regulations in the world	
Fukui earthquake	1948	3,769	First major earthquake after WW2, causing massive damage	Revised construction standards law [disaster risk reduction] • Doubled the horizontal seismic coefficient	
Ise Bay typhoon	1959	5,098	 Inadequate government role in disaster prevention Led by local groups such as flood fighting teams Inappropriate warning systems Inadequate seawalls and dams 	 Enacted the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act [governance] Established Central Disaster Prevention Council headed by the Prime Minister Built early warning system [early disaster warning] Radar on the summit of Mt. Fuji Launched Himawari weather satellite 	

Built seawalls [disaster risk reduction]

After the Hanshin Awaji earthquake in 1995, top-down deployment and strengthening building structure was a priority

History of disasters in Japan (cont'd)

	Year	Dead/ missing	Lessons	Policies introduced
Miyagi earthquake	1978	28	Many concrete apartment buildings thought to be resistant collapsed	 Major revision of construction standards [disaster risk reduction] Introduced new earthquake resistance design law – buildings that would not collapse even under a force 7 earthquake
Hokkaido earthquake	1993	230	Tsunami arrived before the warning system could function	Shortened forecast time from five minutes to three minutes [early warning]
Hanshin Awaji earthquake	1995	6,437	No output from earthquake prediction research 98% of buildings that were destroyed were built before the amended construction law Local government functions were stopped by the disaster • Notification reached the PM two hours after the earthquake • Delayed response by firefighters and self defense forces • Delay in identifying damage in each area Unable to rebuild based on donations alone	Earthquake early warning system implemented [early warning] • Switched from earthquake prediction Enacted earthquake resistance improvement law [disaster risk reduction] • Improving earthquake resistance of existing structures became a key issue Rapid top-down response [emergency/recovery response] • Established Cabinet information gathering center and crisis center at the PM's residence • Law revised to enable quick response by firefighters and self defense forces • Increased seismic observation points for immediate identification of damage in each area Recovery support for victims [emergency/recovery response] • Government financial support up to \3M

Source: Emergency White Paper (2010), The Boston Consulting Group

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Early warning system stopped all 27 running bullet trains automatically before the quake hit


JR East introduces early earthquake warning system

Since the 2004 Mid-Niigata Pref. Earthquake, \50-60B has been invested in earthquake disaster prevention measures.

- Within the JR East area, earthquake measurement equipment has been improved and increased, and the time from early tremor detection, to electric supply cut has been reduced from 3 to 2 seconds
 - Seismographs at 62 locations were upgraded to the latest models in 2005
 - New seismographs were installed at 28 coastal locations in 2006
 - 97 installed in 2010
- By 2009, all carriages of the Tohoku Shinkansen were fitted with an early earthquake warning system



Succeed in making an emergency stop without derailing



Overseas communication from Japan PMO

	Traditional Media		Social Media
3/11	The Great East Japan Earthquake		
3/13	Shikata Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Relations starts interviews with foreign media	3/13	Starts communication through Twitter (Japanese)
3/16	Simultaneous interpreting introduced for PM & Chief Cabinet Secretary announcements	3/16	Starts communication through Twitter (English)
3/20	Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano starts foreign media interviews • holds interviews with 11 media agencies		PM's Office of Japano OFFI 100 ELECTION OFF
3/21	 Foreign Press Briefings by governmental officials starts PMO, Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency, Nuclear Safety Commission, MEXT, MHLW, MAFF, MOFA to April 25 	3/23	Starts communication through Facebook
4/12	Consecutive interpreting for PM's announcements • Questions able to be fielded in English		Frame Continues of National Continues of Nat
4/17	 Editorial contributed by PM "Japan's Road to Recovery and Rebirth" 128 outlets in 62 countries through May 		The state of the s
√ 5/21	Face to face interview between PM & FT		


^{1.} Includes dead/missing, effect of radiation, collapse/damage to houses/offices, disrupted business; 2. Rescue, material aid, recovery of infrastructure, reduced level of radiation, temporary housing Source: Press Search (10 newspapers selected from US, UK, Germany, France, China); PM's Office of Global Communications, The Boston Consulting Group

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
Negative prospects highlighted by media after the Earthquake

Amount of media coverage over time since the quake

Catastrophic damage clearly highlighted over bright prospects



Only limited media coverage after a week of the incident



Earthquake related news got quickly replaced with others before recovery takes place

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^{1.} Includes death/missing, effect of radiation, collapse/damage to houses/offices, disrupted business; 2. Rescue, material aid, recovery of infrastructure, reduced level of radiation, temporary housing Source: Press Search (10 newspapers selected from US, UK, Germany, France, China), The Boston Consulting Group

Mobile phone internet access functioned as the sole means of communication just after the quake

Only Mobile phone internet access remained working

Restriction of telephone calls

To prioritize internet services and emergency call services, call restrictions¹⁾ were imposed

• NTT Docomo: 90%

• KDDI: 95%

Softbank: 70%

Back up of electric power supply

Back-up generators operated at all blackedout exchanges

 Batteries start when electricity supply stops

 Approx. 5 mins later, private power generators start



(Private power generator)

Running on batteries


Re-chargeable, therefore able to be used in blacked-out areas

 Some areas had no PC or TV use due to power failure



Internet access from mobile was the most convenient


Proportion of those who tried who were able to make contact (n=832)



^{1.} Values are for restrictions on cell phone usage for each provider. For fixed phones, the values were 90%, 90% & 80& respectively. The Boston Consulting Group Office of Global Communications Prime Minister's Office

Social media played a pivotal role in confirming people's safety and obtaining disaster information

Number of social media users increased sharply



Uses of social media (example)

Google Person Finder

Confirming

the

safety of someone

information

Checking

- photos of evacuation center name lists uploaded via Picasa
- 320,000 postings were made within 1 week



Twitter hash-tags

- call for help: #i i helpme
- confirm safety: #anpi

Google Crisis Response traffic results map

Roads where traffic successfully passed through the previous

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Many users valued the social media highly

- I sent a DM via Twitter to my wife, with no expectations, and was surprised we made contact so quickly. I think I was the first in my company to confirm my family's safety."
 - Male, 30s
- A gas station was on fire, and black smoke enveloped the area where I live, but I didn't panic after being able to get information on the situation via Twitter."
 - Female, 20s
- I was in London studying, but made a plea for help for my parents using Twitter hashtags, someone who read it helped us."

- Male, 20s

Source: The Boston Consulting Group

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Implications and our challenge

BCG Framework

Decide on actives changing risk

ex) Decide on new project or

profile in portfolio

divestment

Risk management framework

4 key enablers for risk management setup

From an holistic view take strategic risk decisions ex) Invest to reduce (operational) risks



Daily "operationally" manage risks and protect the organization's value ex) Daily risk manage operations in a suitable organizational structure

Create transparency on risks in asset portfolio and activities ex) compile a comprehensive risk register

Our challenge 1: "Know" - Risk recognition and proactive search

The Great East Japan Earthquake

Under estimated magnitude of tsunami and risk of nuclear power generation

- Key lessons from past tsunamis had been weathered away
- Insufficient risk estimation of nuclear power generation

Features

Prerequisite for next stage

Transparency on core risks

- Bottom-up risk maps for core risks
- Not necessarily connected
- · Common basis for communication

Full transparency on all known risks

- Risk identification institutionalized with central coordination
- Group-wide map including risk assessment and risk owners
- Proactive search for new ones
- Key assumptions proactively challenged from risk perspective
- Search for low probabilistic and black swan events

- Connect / merge bottom-up identification
- Extend risk map from core risks only to "all known risks"

- Put extra effort in anticipating black swans and low likelihood events
- Separate process to challenge assumptions (e.g.: black swans)

Our challenge 2: "Manage" Operations related to Global Communications

Government / Ministries

Standardized frameworks

Consistent frameworks roll-outs

Quantitative risk assessment across the nation/government

- Setup quantification procedures
- Introduce/develop quantitative assessment tools

Impact assessment

 Create multiple scenarios for individual risks


Setup/develop emergency governance and procedure

Global Communications

Strengthen multi national language communication and press capability at PMO



- Information flow
- Unified contact and message
- Involvement to decision making and communication strategy building process



Our challenge 3: "Steer"- Investment and Actions for Emergency

Investment

Develop global communication platform

Human resources, Press capability development etc,

Establish a process to ensure continuous commitment and investment

- Prevention of key learning of disasters from going into oblivion
- Annual publication of white papers for disaster prevention governance and process

Structure/relation that enable to leverage neutral/third parties

Scientists , private sectors

Alternative communication route ready for use in future disasters

social media etc.



Timely and transparent communication to meet audience's expectation

- Clear message
- Expectation measurement/awareness
- Communication based on impact scenarios in cases

Clear communication of scientific "gray zone"

- Leverage of credibility of neutral/third party scientists
- Simple and plain delivery of the facts and risks

Implications and call for action to the global community

1. Establish a process to ensure continuous commitment and investment by the government

- Prevention of key learning of disasters from going into oblivion
- Disaster prevention governance and process with annual publication of white papers

2. Leverage multi-national platforms for global sharing of key learning from natural disasters

- Multi-national platforms to share learning beyond the disasters of its own country
- Sharing of learning from past disasters besides the Japan Earthquake
- Sharing of experience/insights from both public and private sectors

3. Establish a global communication platform in case of disaster to close the communication gaps


- Minimization of unnecessary collateral damage
- Alternative communication route (social media etc.) ready for use in future disasters

4. Clear communication of scientific "gray zone"

- Leverage of credibility of neutral/third party scientists
- Simple and plain delivery of the facts and risks

IT lifeline for Disaster Management led by private-public initiatives

The Great East Earthquakes Mar 11, 2011



Lessons learned from the disaster...

Major highlights

Develop the world's most advanced Guidelines on IT lifeline for Disaster Management

Launch new IT lifeline initiatives and services

IT lifeline for disaster management council

Government of Japan


- Led by Prime Minister
 Noda and Minister
 Furukawa
- IT strategic headquarters and across the office and ministries



Private sectors

 Composed of major carriers, internet services, ITS (car navigation) companies and NPOs

Enhancement of disaster management infrastructure in tandem with expansion of media channels



National Policy Unit

Drawing on the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, developing the "Guidelines on IT lifeline for Disaster Management"

Immediate aftermath of earthquake

Recovery

Reconstruction

- 1. Disclosure and secondary use of government disaster information
- 2. Collection and public use of grassroots information
- 3. Development of an emergency dissemination/communications network
- 4. Extensive drills for information dissemination for disaster management
- 5. Internationalization of disaster management information protocol
- 6. Ensuring operation of information infrastructure during emergencies

1	
Dissemination of information on supports for disaster-affected people	Revival of communities
Development of recovery and reconstruction-support system DB	Company activities using IT/Reinforced management of social infrastructure
Rebuilding of community medical services	Government information system tailored to disaster risk
Understanding mid- to long-term health conditions of disaster-affected people	Rehabilitation of SMEs in disaster area/creation of new industries
IT utilization support for disaster- affected people	Rehabilitation of agricultural and fishery centers

Key lessons from past tsunamis had been weathered away

Tsunami of similar proportion hit the Sanriku area in 1896 and 1933

Due to the rias coastal characteristics of the region, they have experienced tsunamis before

- 1896 Meiji Sanriku Tsunami
 - magnitude 8.5 earthquake
 - 22,066 fatalities
 - 8891 houses washed away
- 1933 Showa Sanriku Great Tsunami
 - magnitude 8.1 earthquake
 - 1522 fatalities
 - 4885 houses washed away

Before & after the Showa Sanriku Great Tsunami

...people in the Sanriku area built stone monuments to warn their descendants...

Ancestors erected stone monuments marking the point reached by the tsunami, engraved with the warning "Do not build homes below this point"

A high dwelling is peace and harmony for children and grandchildren. Remember the tsunami calamity. Do not build below this point

In 1896 and 1933, tsunami reached this area and the settlement was destroyed, only 2 survived in front, and 4 behind

Precaution is needed no matter how many years pass



Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture

...some people ignored those warnings and suffered from the tsunami

People make decisions based on convenience and choose to ignore the lessons from the past.

- "Since fishing is my only means of earning a living, it would be too much trouble getting to and from work if I built my home on the hill"
- "I know the dangers of tsunami, but don't think one will come in my lifetime"

Homes built below the monument were washed away, and 304 people died.



Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture